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ECON-604 Microeconomics IV
Fall only
ECON 604 – PhD Micro IV
This is the second part of the Theory Field of the PhD program in Economics.
Econ 601 and Econ 602 are prerequisites for the course. Econ 603 is highly
recommended, but because of scheduling problems it is not a formal prerequisite for the class.
Your final grade will be based on class presentations (50%) and a final exam (50%).
The complete syllabus for this class is not finalized yet. Much of the organization of the course will depend on how many students register, how many come along without registering, and specific interests.
The material covered will be a combination of topics in Bounded Rationality and Contract Theory broadly construed.
Last, but NOT LEAST, a word of caution about MATH. This Class DOES involve some
hard math. Though not all topics covered require it, the math used in some parts of the course exceeds that used in Econ 601, 602 and 603. This does not mean that I expect students to know the mathematical tools involved; we will pick them up as we go along.
However, you must be willing to make some fairly heavy investments in this sense.
Here are some relevant readings. Please note that this list may expand as we go along.
OD Hart (1995): “Firms Contracts and Financial Structure.” Oxford University Press.
P Bolton and M Dewatripont (2005): “Contract Theory.” MIT Press.
L. Anderlini and L. Felli (1994): “Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 1085-1124.
N Al-Najjar , L. Anderlini and L. Felli (2006): “ Undescribable Events.” Review of Economic Studies, 73, :849-868.
L. Anderlini and L.Felli (2001): “Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation.” Econometrica, 69:377-411.
L. Anderlini and L. Felli (2006): “Transaction costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem.” Economic Journal , 116:223-245.
The papers below are a superset of those that will be assigned for presentation by students in class.
Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1986): “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:
A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” Journal of Political Economy 94,691-719.
Hart, O. and More, J. (1990): “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,”Journal of Political Economy 98, 1119-58.
Rajan, R. and Zingales , L. (1998): “Power in a Theory of the Firm,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 387-432.
Aghion,P. and Tirole , J. (1997): “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,” Journal of
Political Economy 105, 1-29.
Anderlini, L., Felli , L. and Postlewaite, A. (2007): “Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies.” Journal of Law, Economic & Organization 23:662
-684.
Hart, O and Moore, J. (1988): “Incomplete Contracts and
Renegotiation,” Econometrica, 56, 755-86.
Aghion, P.,Dewatripont , M. and Rey, P (1994): “Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information,”
Econometrica 62 , 257-282.
Che, Y K. and Hausch, D. (1999): “Cooperative Investments and the Value of
Contracting,”American Economic Review 89, 125-147.
Maskin, E. and Tirole, J. (1990): “The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values,”Econometrica 58, 549-569.
Maskin, E. and Tirole, J.(1992): “The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values,” Econometrica 60, 1-42.
Maskin, E. and Tirole, J. (1999): “Unforeseen Contingencies and
Incomplete Contracts,”Review of Economic Studies 66, 83-114.
Segal, I. (1999): “Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for
Incomplete Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies, 66, 57-82.
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1999): “Foundations of Incomplete Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies 66, 115-138.
Credits: 3
Prerequisites: Econ 601 and Econ 602
Sections:
ECON-604-01 Microeconomics IV
Fall only
ECON 604 – PhD Micro IV
This is the second part of the Theory Field of the PhD program in Economics.
Econ 601 and Econ 602 are prerequisites for the course. Econ 603 is highly
recommended, but because of scheduling problems it is not a formal prerequisite for the class.
Your final grade will be based on class presentations (50%) and a final exam (50%).
The complete syllabus for this class is not finalized yet. Much of the organization of the course will depend on how many students register, how many come along without registering, and specific interests.
The material covered will be a combination of topics in Bounded Rationality and Contract Theory broadly construed.
Last, but NOT LEAST, a word of caution about MATH. This Class DOES involve some
hard math. Though not all topics covered require it, the math used in some parts of the course exceeds that used in Econ 601, 602 and 603. This does not mean that I expect students to know the mathematical tools involved; we will pick them up as we go along.
However, you must be willing to make some fairly heavy investments in this sense.
Here are some relevant readings. Please note that this list may expand as we go along.
OD Hart (1995): “Firms Contracts and Financial Structure.” Oxford University Press.
P Bolton and M Dewatripont (2005): “Contract Theory.” MIT Press.
L. Anderlini and L. Felli (1994): “Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 1085-1124.
N Al-Najjar , L. Anderlini and L. Felli (2006): “ Undescribable Events.” Review of Economic Studies, 73, :849-868.
L. Anderlini and L.Felli (2001): “Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation.” Econometrica, 69:377-411.
L. Anderlini and L. Felli (2006): “Transaction costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem.” Economic Journal , 116:223-245.
The papers below are a superset of those that will be assigned for presentation by students in class.
Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1986): “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:
A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” Journal of Political Economy 94,691-719.
Hart, O. and More, J. (1990): “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,”Journal of Political Economy 98, 1119-58.
Rajan, R. and Zingales , L. (1998): “Power in a Theory of the Firm,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 387-432.
Aghion,P. and Tirole , J. (1997): “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,” Journal of
Political Economy 105, 1-29.
Anderlini, L., Felli , L. and Postlewaite, A. (2007): “Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies.” Journal of Law, Economic & Organization 23:662
-684.
Hart, O and Moore, J. (1988): “Incomplete Contracts and
Renegotiation,” Econometrica, 56, 755-86.
Aghion, P.,Dewatripont , M. and Rey, P (1994): “Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information,”
Econometrica 62 , 257-282.
Che, Y K. and Hausch, D. (1999): “Cooperative Investments and the Value of
Contracting,”American Economic Review 89, 125-147.
Maskin, E. and Tirole, J. (1990): “The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values,”Econometrica 58, 549-569.
Maskin, E. and Tirole, J.(1992): “The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values,” Econometrica 60, 1-42.
Maskin, E. and Tirole, J. (1999): “Unforeseen Contingencies and
Incomplete Contracts,”Review of Economic Studies 66, 83-114.
Segal, I. (1999): “Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for
Incomplete Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies, 66, 57-82.
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1999): “Foundations of Incomplete Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies 66, 115-138.
Credits: 3
Prerequisites: Econ 601 and Econ 602
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Other academic years
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